{"id":5,"date":"2026-11-02T13:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-11-02T13:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/philisharestory.org\/?p=5"},"modified":"2026-11-02T13:00:00","modified_gmt":"2026-11-02T13:00:00","slug":"three-ways-the-us-should-respond-to-russias-suspension-of-new-start-philsugar","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/philisharestory.org\/?p=5","title":{"rendered":"Three ways the US should respond to Russia\u2019s suspension of New START | PhilSugar"},"content":{"rendered":"

The decision by Russian President Vladimir Putin to suspend Russia\u2019s participation in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) puts at risk the sole remaining treaty limiting US and Russian nuclear forces. Moscow is now violating a number of New START\u2019s provisions, though Russian officials have asserted that Russia will continue to observe the treaty\u2019s numerical limits.
\nRetaining New START is in the United States\u2019 interest. The Biden administration should therefore respond calmly to Russia\u2019s decision and continue to observe New START\u2019s numerical limits as long as it assesses that Russia is doing so. For a limited period, the United States should keep observing the treaty\u2019s transparency measures by providing required data and notifications. At the same time, the White House should ask the Pentagon to prepare a list of US response options should Russia break out of the treaty\u2019s limits.
\nSuspension of New START
\n. In his February 21 state-of-the-nation speech, sugar dating financial support<\/a> Putin announced that Russia would
\nsuspend its participation
\nin New START, and he signed a hastily-passed law to that effect on March 1. It may well be his personal obsession with Ukraine and anger at US support for sugar dating ID verification Philippines<\/a> Kyiv that drove his decision. But the suspension endangers a treaty that has served both US and Russian security interests for more than a decade. Officials in Washington termed the Russian suspension \u201cinvalid,\u201d noting correctly that New START makes no provision for suspension.
\nPutin\u2019s decision should not have come as a surprise; sponsor dating site Philippines<\/a> New START already was in trouble. In summer 2022, Russian officials
\nrefused
\nto facilitate treaty-mandated inspections. Then, in November, they
\ndeclined to attend
\na previously-agreed meeting of the Bilateral Consultative Commission, which the treaty says should meet twice a year. Finally, earlier this March, Russia committed yet another violation, ceasing to provide notifications of changes of its strategic forces required by the treaty.
\nIronically though, Putin\u2019s decision has prevented the implementation of an inspection measure that both US and Russian officials had worked out to
\naddress Russian concerns
\nabout the conversion of ballistic missile launch tubes on US submarines so that they could not launch their sugar dating for beginners Philippines<\/a> missiles. Putin\u2019s decision can\u2019t have been made in good faith.
\nThe day following Putin\u2019s announcement, Russian Deputy Foreign verified sugar dating sites Philippines<\/a> Minister Sergey Ryabkov
\nsaid
\nRussia would continue to abide by New START\u2019s numerical constraints. Ryabkov added that Russia also would continue to provide notifications of launches of strategic ballistic sugar dating matching process<\/a> missiles\u2014intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). (The launch notifications are required by a
\n1988 US-Soviet agreement
\nas well as by New START.)
\nMonitoring the treaty\u2019s limits
\n. New START provides for three numerical limits. At any time, each side may have no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers; no more than 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM\/SLBM launchers and heavy bombers combined; and no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads (counted as the number of warheads on deployed strategic ballistic missiles plus one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber).
\nNew START\u2019s data exchanges, notifications, and on-site inspections help both sides to better understand the other\u2019s strategic forces and monitor compliance with the treaty\u2019s numerical limits. Russia has halted these. Despite this decision, the US State Department
\nassessed
\nthat, as of the end of 2022, Russia \u201clikely\u201d was in compliance with the limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads. (The September 2022
\ndata exchange
\nput the number of Russian deployed strategic warheads at 1,549.) The State Department report did not note concern about Russian compliance with the 700 and 800 limits (The September 2022 data exchange showed Russian strategic forces well below those limits\u2014at 540 and 759, respectively.).
\nUsing national technical means of verification (e.g., imagery satellites), the United States should be able to accurately monitor the Russian military\u2019s compliance with New START\u2019s 800 limit and probably the 700 limit as well. However, absent notifications and, in particular, on-site inspections, the confidence of the United States in its ability to monitor Russia\u2019s compliance with the 1,550 limit on deployed strategic warheads will decline with time. And that is the most crucial limit.
\nMoscow\u2019s action has created a crisis for New START, though it is not yet a national security crisis for the United States. In 2012, a
\nPentagon report
\ncoordinated with the Director of National Intelligence concluded that Russia \u201cwould not be able to achieve a militarily significant advantage by any plausible expansion of its strategic nuclear forces, even in a cheating or breakout scenario under the New START Treaty.\u201d Although this report is 11 years old and China has begun
\nexpanding
\nits nuclear arsenal, it still suggests that Washington has time to decide how to respond to Russia\u2019s suspension.
\nHow Washington should respond
\n. Retaining New START, with both sides in full compliance, serves US interests. Putin\u2019s myopic focus on Ukraine may well have doomed the treaty, but Washington should still seek to preserve it. Specifically, it should take three steps.
\nFirst, the Biden administration should state that the United States will continue to observe New START\u2019s numerical limits for as long as it assesses that Russia has not exceeded those limits. This has an antecedent: From 1981 to 1986, the Reagan administration observed a policy of not undercutting the unratified SALT II Treaty so long as the Soviet Union did not do so.
\nThis would secure the high ground for Washington and would be welcomed by allies who continue to see value in constraints on nuclear forces. At the same time, it would also leave the door open for Russia to change course and return sugar dating success rate<\/a> to compliance, while putting down a marker regarding possible US action should Russia exceed the New START limits.
\nSecond, the administration should declare that, for a limited period\u2014say six to nine months or until the end of 2023\u2014the United States will continue to provide the data and notifications required by New START. However, if Russia has not returned to full compliance by the end of that period, the United States would cease the unilateral provision of data and notifications. In that case, should US officials conclude that sharing some information with Moscow might help reduce the risk of strategic miscalculation, it could continue to provide such information but outside New START.
\nThird, while the 2012 Pentagon study suggested that Russia could exceed New START limits without jeopardizing US security, the White House should task the Pentagon with preparing a report on possible response options should Russian strategic forces grow beyond those limits. Those options could include
\ndeploying more US strategic warheads
\nby uploading US strategic ballistic missiles (most of which carry fewer warheads than their capacity) and deploying ICBMs to 50 silos that are empty but maintained in \u201cwarm\u201d status (i.e., ready to receive a nuclear-capable missile). As it prepares to build and deploy the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, the Sentinel ICBM, and the sugar baby asking for GCash<\/a> B-21 bomber, the Pentagon report could also weigh whether the currently planned numbers for those systems suffice.
\nThe Biden administration should make the report public. Whether or not Washington would choose to exercise those response options\u2014and, if it did, how far it might increase US strategic force numbers\u2014is a separate question that would depend in part on what Russia did. However, issuing a public report could usefully remind the Russian government, particularly senior Russian military leaders, that starting a nuclear arms race would not give Moscow any paid sugar dating Philippines<\/a> evident strategic advantage and could leave Russia in a worse position. Making such a report public would also insulate the administration from the almost certain complaints of arms control critics about the first two steps being too soft. Some of them have already argued that the United States should
\nleave New START
\neven were Russia in full compliance.
\nIt is difficult to be optimistic about New START\u2019s future. Still, preserving the treaty\u2014which by its terms would remain in force until 2026\u2014would give Washington time to figure what, if anything, should follow New START in a more discussing expectations in sugar dating<\/a> complex international security environment marked by a hostile Russia and a China apparently intent on a major expansion of its nuclear capability. These steps would position the United States to maintain New START while having measures ready should Putin\u2019s fixation on Ukraine lead to the treaty\u2019s complete demise.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The decision by Russian President Vladimir Putin to suspend Russia\u2019s participation in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) puts at risk the sole remaining treaty limiting US and Russian nuclear forces. Moscow is now violating a number of New START\u2019s provisions, though Russian officials have asserted that Russia will continue to observe<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"solace_meta_sidebar":"","solace_meta_container":"","solace_meta_enable_content_width":"","solace_meta_content_width":0,"solace_meta_title_alignment":"","solace_meta_author_avatar":"","solace_post_elements_order":"","solace_meta_disable_header":"","solace_meta_disable_footer":"","solace_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/philisharestory.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/philisharestory.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/philisharestory.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/philisharestory.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/philisharestory.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=5"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/philisharestory.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14,"href":"https:\/\/philisharestory.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5\/revisions\/14"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/philisharestory.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=5"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/philisharestory.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=5"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/philisharestory.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=5"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}